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OCEAN ACIDIFICATION POLICY: APPLYING THE 
LESSONS OF WASHINGTON TO CALIFORNIA 
AND BEYOND 
Ryan P. Kelly* 
ABSTRACT: This Article aims to distill the lessons of Washington’s experience 
with ocean acidification (OA) policy and apply them to the political framework 
that exists in California. More generally, this Article evaluates the political 
landscape in which OA policy is taking shape along the west coast of the United 
States and highlights elements of a political and policy strategy that would build 
current momentum on OA in California and elsewhere into a larger, more 
sustained policy infrastructure capable of addressing coastal issues of 
environmental resilience and water quality in the context of global change. It 
concludes by identifying some ways in which OA policy might benefit from action 
on—and constituencies for—the multiple interacting drivers of environmental 
change.1 
                                               
* Assistant Professor, School of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of 
Washington; J.D., University of California, Berkley, School of Law (Boalt Hall); Ph.D., 
Columbia University. Email: rpkelly@uw.edu. 
 1. In gathering information in the fall of 2016, I had discussions with a cross-section 
of professionals in California and Washington, all of whom had significant histories of 
policy or scientific engagement on the issues. I distilled the respondents’ comments and 
framed them against the backdrop of the major relevant laws and institutions governing 
environmental policy in the two states, referencing current legal and scientific literature 
only where necessary to support key points. Throughout, I have provided opinion about 
likely outcomes or trajectories of change; where I have done so, I have tried to make 
apparent the factual basis for this opinion. 
  My interviewees included Lisa Graumlich (Dean, University of Washington College 
of the Environment), Jan Newton (University of Washington and Co-Director, 
Washington Ocean Acidification Center), Terrie Klinger (University of Washington and 
Co-Director, Washington Ocean Acidification Center), Steve Weisberg (Southern 
California Coastal Water Research Project), Ali Boehm (Stanford University), Jen 
Phillips (California Ocean Protection Council), Meg Caldwell (David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation), Skyli McAfee (The Nature Conservancy, formerly Executive Director, 
California Ocean Science Trust), Cat Kuhlman (formerly Executive Director, California 
Ocean Protection Council and Deputy Secretary, Oceans and Coastal Policy), Terry 
Sawyer (Founding Partner, Hog Island Oyster Company), Ashley Erickson (Stanford 
University, Center for Ocean Solutions), and Jodie Toft (The Nature Conservancy, 
Washington). In addition, earlier drafts of this Article benefitted from comments by 
Matt Armsby (Resources Legacy Fund), Sarah Cooley and George Leonard (Ocean 
Conservancy), Steve Weisberg, and Emily Knight (California Ocean Science Trust). Note 
that the views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of 
individual interviewees, and neither do they necessarily represent consensus among 
interviewees. Rather, I have summarized trends in responses and overarching themes. 
Any errors are my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ocean acidification (OA) is the global change in the marine 
chemical environment—a significant decrease in pH, towards a 
more acidic state—that has resulted from humanity’s CO2 
emissions over the course of the industrial era.2 As with other 
large-scale ocean changes such as warming, sea-level rise, 
hypoxia, and shifts in species assemblages (including an 
increase in harmful algal blooms), OA will alter marine 
ecosystems and the associated services on which humans have 
come to depend.3 
Recent years have seen a spike in OA science, leading directly 
                                               
2. See generally J.-P. Gattuso et al., Contrasting Futures for Ocean and Society from 
Different Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Scenarios, 349 SCI. 1, 3 (2015), 
http://hal.upmc.fr/hal-01176217/document. 
3. Id. 
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to an increase in public awareness and political attention.4 The 
legal and policy responses to OA have only started to take shape 
in the past few years,5 as the scope of the challenge has become 
clearer. Any approach to tackle OA must marry political 
opportunity to scientific insight. 
OA is mainly a global CO2-driven problem6—although local 
exacerbating factors can shift the policy calculus to favor local 
mitigating actions—which undermines any given jurisdiction’s 
options and incentives for acting to mitigate its effects. 
Nevertheless, the State of Washington has made financial and 
political commitments that have already been a model for other 
jurisdictions wishing to combat OA.7 Washington’s experience 
suggests there are political and scientific opportunities in 
California, Oregon, and elsewhere, despite inevitable state-level 
differences in the political landscape. 
Although Washington continues to lead other jurisdictions on 
OA policy, its actions remain focused on scientific research and 
monitoring, rather than on combating the causes or effects of 
OA.8 Any jurisdiction wishing to actually mitigate OA will have 
to go further than Washington has gone to date, by curbing 
anthropogenic inputs to the ocean or buffering the social and 
ecological effects of an already-changed ocean. However, a 
critical question remains unanswered pending experimental 
                                               
4. Sarah R. Cooley et al., Community-Level Actions that Can Address Ocean 
Acidification, 2 FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCI. 1, 3 (2016) (“On the North American Pacific 
coast, California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia have agreed to share 
information and combat ocean acidification by urging the American and Canadian 
governments to further research, model, and monitor their shared waters for ocean 
acidification through the Pacific Coast Collaborative.”). 
5. See, e.g., Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat 
Ocean Acidification (and Why They Should), 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2013) 
[hereinafter Ten Ways]; Raphaël Billé et al., Taking Action Against Ocean Acidification: 
A Review of Management and Policy Options, 52 ENVTL. MGMT. 761 (2013); Aaron L. 
Strong et al., Ocean Acidification 2.0: Managing our Changing Coastal Ocean 
Chemistry, 64 BIOSCIENCE 581 (2014). 
6. Gattuso et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
7. For example, the California-led West Coast Ocean Acidification & Hypoxia Panel, 
discussed throughout this Article. “Inspired by the groundbreaking work of the 
Washington Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, the [California Ocean Protection 
Council] asked Ocean Science Trust to establish a scientific advisory panel on ocean 
acidification and hypoxia (OAH) in collaboration with Oregon, Washington, and British 
Columbia.” History, THE WEST COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION & HYPOXIA SCI. PANEL, 
http://westcoastoah.org/history/ (last visited June 12, 2017). 
8. Washington has a variety of CO2-focused efforts aimed at curbing climate change, 
but I omit these here because they arose independently of the OA policies. 
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and modeling work: which state actions could have a 
measurable and meaningful impact on OA? Unless and until the 
scientific data are available to demonstrate the likely effect of 
such state action, it is unlikely that an agency will be willing to 
invest the time and political capital necessary to develop new 
rules. Even given a convincing demonstration of OA policy 
changes, effective social and economic adaptation to an 
inevitably changing ocean will require additional political 
leadership that has not yet arisen in Washington or elsewhere. 
Although basic science, modeling, and monitoring continue to be 
essential to address key unanswered questions in the OA policy 
landscape, it is clear that ocean chemistry will continue to 
change at an accelerating rate in the absence of governmental 
action to reduce inputs into the coastal ocean.9 
In this short Article, I summarize the state of affairs—both 
politically and scientifically—in Washington and California 
regarding OA, the specific political motivations for action in 
Washington and California, and the lessons of the past several 
years that might benefit California and other jurisdictions. 
Then, I discuss a set of emerging issues at the science/policy 
boundary with respect to OA along the West Coast, via a list of 
key questions that interviewees raised, before concluding. 
II. THE POLITICAL & SCIENTIFIC BACKDROP IN 
WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA 
A. Recent Governmental Action 
Washington and California have taken up OA policy as a 
result of different motivating factors, and these differences are 
informative for framing the next steps of OA policy in these 
states and elsewhere. 
Washington’s motivation for action on OA was a combination 
of a fortuitous political moment and an environmental problem 
that had started to harm the culturally important shellfish 
industry. The state’s oyster industry used a single point of 
contact10 to successfully advocate first for financial support from 
                                               
9. See generally, e.g., Gattuso et al., supra note 2. See also Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean 
Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. OF MARINE SCI. 169 (2009). 
10. Bill Dewey, Director of Public Affairs for Taylor Shellfish. See 2012 Panel Members 
and Meetings, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited June 12, 2017) 
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the federal government11 and then political support from the 
state government.12 The then-governor was receptive to taking 
action on environmental issues in general, but likely especially 
so in 2012, which was her final year in office. By that time, data 
from NOAA’s Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory had 
become available and solidified the science of OA in the region.13 
In sum, industry drove action in Washington, and found willing 
partners in scientists and the state government. 
In 2012, Washington created a Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean 
Acidification, highlighting the shift in ocean chemistry as a 
political issue on the West Coast.14 The Panel developed a set of 
political and scientific recommendations,15 and the State 
successfully implemented a number of these recommendations 
in the succeeding years. Legislation in 2013 established the 
Marine Resources Advisory Council (MRAC) within the office of 
the Governor to coordinate work within the state and at the 
University of Washington on OA and to advise the Governor and 
state legislature on related matters.16 The same year saw the 
legislature allocate funding to the Washington Ocean 
                                               
(highlighting Dewey’s involvement on the Blue Ribbon Panel as the key shellfish 
industry representative). 
11. In 2010, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell’s office helped provide financial support for 
real-time ocean-chemistry monitoring equipment that came to the industry’s aid, 
particularly in Washington. See Cantwell Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Establish 
National Ocean Acidification Monitoring Strategy, MARIA CANTWELL U.S. SENATOR FOR 
WASH. (July 30, 2015), https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cantwell-
introduces-bipartisan-bill-to-establish-national-ocean-acidification-monitoring-
strategy. 
12. In late 2011, then-Governor Gregoire initiated the Washington Blue Ribbon Panel 
on Ocean Acidification partly in response to industry entreaties. See Washington 
Shellfish Initiative Ocean Acidification Blue Ribbon Panel Charter, WASH. STATE DEP’T 
OF ECOLOGY (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/charter.pdf. 
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Feely et al., The Combined Effects of Ocean Acidification, 
Mixing, and Respiration on pH and Carbonate Saturation in an Urbanized Estuary, 88 
ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 442 (2010). See also Alan Barton et al., The Pacific 
Oyster, Crassostrea Gigas, Shows Negative Correlation to Naturally Elevated Carbon 
Dioxide Levels: Implications for Near-Term Ocean Acidification Effects, 57 LIMNOLOGY 
& OCEANOGRAPHY 698, 698 (2012). 
14. See WASH. STATE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION (2012), 
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1201015.pdf [hereinafter 
KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION]. See 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, WASH. 
STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/2012panel.html (last 
visited June 12, 2017). 
15. KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION, supra note 14. 
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016). 
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Acidification Center at the University of Washington for 
research and monitoring purposes.17 
A second element advancing the policy discussion in 
Washington was—and continues to be—lawsuits filed by the 
Center for Biological Diversity (CBD). These suits bear directly 
on the state’s official reaction to its changing water chemistry. 
CBD filed the first OA-related lawsuit against the U.S. EPA in 
2009, challenging that agency’s approval of Washington’s 2008 
list of impaired waters (required under Section 303(d) of the 
Clean Water Act).18 Although Washington was not the 
defendant in that suit or in subsequent ones, the CBD lawsuits 
put the state on notice that it was under national scrutiny for 
its handling of OA. The EPA eventually settled the suit, and, as 
a result of the settlement, the EPA requested data on OA and 
considered altering the national guideline for marine pH.19 The 
EPA ultimately decided against the change, citing insufficient 
information to change the federal standard.20 To date, no state 
has created a more stringent guideline. 
In a more recent suit, CBD again lost on substantive grounds, 
largely as a result of a limited ability to tie global trends in OA 
to here-and-now violations of water quality criteria within state 
waters.21 However, the group won an important procedural 
battle in the District Court for the Western District of 
Washington in 2015 by establishing causation and 
redressability in its suit over the EPA’s 2012 approval of 
Washington’s and Oregon’s 2010 303(d) lists.22 There, CBD 
successfully highlighted the possibility that state-level total 
                                               
17. Id. § 79.105.150. 
18. Meline MacCurdy, EPA to Consider Ocean Acidification Under Section 303(d) of 
Clean Water Act, MARTEN LAW (April 1, 2010), 
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100401-cwa-ocean-acidification (citing 
Complaint at 2–3, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, No. 2:09-cv-00670-JCC 
(W.D. Wash. filed May 14, 2009), 2009 WL 1390743). 
19. Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Notice of Call for Public Comment on 303(d) 
Program and Ocean Acidification, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,537 (Mar. 22, 2010). 
20. See Barton et al., supra note 13. See also EPA, MEMORANDUM ON INTEGRATED 
REPORTING AND LISTING DECISIONS RELATED TO OCEAN ACIDIFICATION (2010), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
01/documents/memo_integrated_reporting_and_listing_decisions_related_to_ocean_aci
dfication.pdf. 
21. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
22. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 
2015) (highlighting the possibility that state-level TMDLs could provide a remedy to 
coastal OA by reducing local inputs likely to exacerbate the global CO2-driven trend). 
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maximum daily loads (TMDLs) could provide a remedy to 
coastal OA by reducing local inputs that are likely to exacerbate 
the global CO2-driven trend.23 More broadly, CBD’s repeated 
lawsuits likely function as a constraint on the state’s decision-
making with respect to water quality criteria, insofar as they 
prevent the state from ignoring its changing ocean chemistry 
with impunity. 
In contrast to Washington, California’s initial motivation to 
tackle OA as a policy issue came from governmental (and 
politically connected non-governmental) scientists, who wanted 
to know if those same issues highlighted in Washington also 
mattered in California.24 In particular, it was unclear whether 
OA in California was likely to be of a policy-relevant magnitude 
and whether OA threatened California’s marine protected 
areas. The inquiry fell to the California Ocean Protection 
Council (OPC), a non-regulatory, cabinet-level body that 
coordinates administrative agencies and suggests legislative 
and policy actions on ocean issues in California.25 
In 2013, the OPC asked the Ocean Science Trust (OST)—a 
non-profit entity created by state statute that works to integrate 
science and decision-making across state agencies—to 
commission a panel to study the effects of OA, as well as OA’s 
linkages with hypoxia.26 The OPC convened twenty leading 
experts in the field of OA from California, Oregon, Washington, 
and British Columbia, creating the West Coast Ocean 
Acidification & Hypoxia Science Panel (OA/H Panel).27 At least 
four elements favored adding hypoxia to the mix of salient ocean 
                                               
23. Id. at 1195–96 (finding that CBD established causation and redressability, Judge 
Robart reasoned that “the relief CBD seeks—the listing of acidified-impaired waters—
is the necessary forerunner to the establishment of TMDLs or other water quality 
improvement techniques, and, according to Congress, the appropriate means of 
achieving desired water quality.”). 
24. Although this assertion arose from interviews with OA/H Panel members, some 
additional support may be found in the fact that the California Panel’s website lists the 
Washington Panel’s report first among its linked “Key Documents.” See History, THE 
WEST COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION AND HYPOXIA SCI. PANEL, 
http://westcoastoah.org/history/ (last visited June 13, 2017). 
25. See About the Council, CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, http://www.opc.ca.gov/about/ 
(last visited June 13, 2017). The OPC was created by the California Ocean Protection 
Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 35500. See infra Part VI for a more detailed description of 
OPC and other key institutions in California and Washington that are relevant to OA. 
26. F. CHAN ET. AL., THE WEST COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION AND HYPOXIA SCIENCE 
PANEL: MAJOR FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ACTIONS 4 (2016). 
27. Id. at 32. 
7
Kelly: Ocean Acidification Policy: Applying the Lessons of Washington to
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
8 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y [Vol. 7:1 
 
focal points worthy of study: (1) Oregon’s participation on the 
OA/H Panel—where commercial fisheries’ losses due to hypoxia 
were a key concern; (2) public comment; (3) OPC and Ocean 
Science Trust’s desire to evaluate OA in a multi-stressor 
context; and (4) then-OPC Executive Director Cat Kuhlman’s 
significant background interest in water quality.28 
One further enabling condition surrounding the OA/H Panel 
and California’s involvement in OA as a policy issue was the 
existence of the California Current Acidification Network (C-
CAN), a network for sharing OA information West Coast-wide.29 
The goal of C-CAN is to keep a wide variety of stakeholders 
informed, evenhandedly serving industry, academia, and 
relevant government scientists.30 It may be that C-CAN 
facilitated a degree of consensus among a more diverse set of 
groups than was actually represented on the OA/H Panel, 
creating a background level political support for the panel and 
for policy action more generally.31 
In 2016, the OA/H Panel finalized a set of recommendations,32 
similar to the recommendations made by Washington’s Blue 
Ribbon Panel, creating a significant opportunity in California 
for political action on OA. Two new California state laws offer a 
partial response to the Panel’s recommendations: AB 2139 
(Williams, Ocean Acidification and Hypoxia Task Force)33 and 
                                               
28. This list of rationales for including hypoxia comes from interviews with OA/H 
Panel participants and leadership. 
29. CAL. CURRENT ACIDIFICATION NETWORK, VISION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A WEST 
COAST NETWORK MONITORING MARINE ACIDIFICATION AND ITS LINKAGE TO BIOLOGICAL 
EFFECTS IN THE NEARSHORE ENVIRONMENT (2013), http://www.c-can.info/reference/C-
CAN%20%20Vision%20Document%20Final.pdf. 
30. Id. at 2. 
31. For further discussion on this point see Sarah R. Cooley et al., Getting Ocean 
Acidification on Decision Makers’ To-Do Lists: Dissecting the Process Through Case 
Studies, 28 OCEANOGRAPHY 198, 204 (2015). 
32. CHAN ET AL., supra note 26. There is substantial overlap in the recommendations 
of the two panels, with the latter panel additionally highlighting (a) the desirability of 
understanding interactions among multiple stressors, and (b) the need for West Coast-
wide collaboration on scientific and policy action. Jan Newton (a member of both Panels, 
and co-director of the Washington Ocean Acidification Center) generated a “crosswalk” 
between the recommendations of the Washington and California panels, presented to 
the Washington Marine Resources Advisory Council on April 25, 2016. See WASH. STATE 
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, COALESCING SCIENCE FOR POLICY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WEST 
COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION AND HYPOXIA SCIENCE PANEL, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/20160425MRAChypoxiapanel.pdf (last visited 
June 13, 2017). 
33. California Ocean Protection Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35631 (West Supp. 2017). 
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SB 1363 (Monning, Ocean Acidification and Hypoxia Reduction 
Program).34  These new laws are important mainly because they 
represent official recognition of OA as a challenge to coastal 
environmental quality, rather than for any new authority they 
provide. Nevertheless, the laws illustrate California’s official 
recognition of OA and hypoxia-related issues, and of the state’s 
emerging role in responding to these issues. 
Washington’s Blue Ribbon Panel and California’s OA/H Panel 
illustrate the political momentum surrounding OA as an 
environmental issue and the growth of that momentum in 
recent years. The question is, what’s next? How will 
Washington, California, or other states take action to mitigate 
and adapt to OA, and what are the politically feasible paths to 
these end goals? 
B. Latitudinal Differences in Water Chemistry and Relevance 
for OA Politics 
A key biophysical difference between California and 
Washington is relevant to the political and policy analysis that 
follows. On the whole, Washington’s Puget Sound—where most 
of the state’s human population is clustered35 and the location 
of a significant portion of its aquaculture36—experiences OA to 
a somewhat greater degree than California or most other 
jurisdictions in the U.S. In part, this is because the calcium 
carbonate saturation state (𝛺)37—a key factor for understanding 
                                               
(“. . . the council may develop an ocean acidification and hypoxia science task force to 
ensure that decisionmaking is supported by the best available science.”) The Act also 
includes mandatory language—subject to the availability of funding—for adaptive and 
potentially mitigative measures, including “ensure that criteria and standards for 
coastal water health to address ocean acidification and hypoxia are developed and 
informed by the best available science.” Id. 
34. California Ocean Protection Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630, 35632 (West 
Supp. 2017). (“[OPC] shall establish and administer the Ocean Acidification and 
Hypoxia Reduction Program,” which includes demonstration projects of multiple 
stressors, inventories of candidate sites for mitigation, and other elements.). 
35. See generally WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT. FORECASTING & RESEARCH DIV., 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 2016 POPULATION TRENDS (2016), 
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/april1/poptrends.pdf. 
36. See generally Overview Saving Puget Sound, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/puget_sound/overview.html (last visited June 13, 2017). 
37. This parameter reflects the chemical balance of compounds in seawater that affect 
species’ ability to build shells and other hard parts. See Ocean Acidification: Saturation 
State, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://sos.noaa.gov/Datasets/dataset.php?id=173 (last visited June 13, 2017). Higher 
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the impacts of changing pH on shell-forming marine life—is 
naturally lower at higher latitudes.38 The building blocks of 
animals’ shell material—calcite and aragonite—are less stable 
at lower 𝛺.39 The deep, fjord-like shape of Puget Sound (setting 
up stratification and high-CO2, low-𝛺 conditions at depth due to 
respiration), and a narrow continental shelf with significant 
upwelling (bringing low-𝛺 water to the surface) exacerbate the 
latitudinal effect.40 By contrast, California’s more open coastline 
is somewhat warmer (particularly in the Southern California 
Bight) and less stratified, and therefore tends to have overall 
higher ambient levels of 𝛺 despite similar coastal upwelling in 
places.41 
In practical terms, this means Washington’s marine 
ecosystems are likely to be some years ahead of California in 
terms of exposure to OA. At present, we lack smoking-gun 
evidence of OA impacts in California of the kind that have led 
to political interest in Washington, where the well-organized 
shellfish industry quickly perceived that it was losing money as 
a result of OA and committed to raising and sustaining political 
attention to the issue.42 In California, other aspects of changing 
ocean conditions—for example, increases in sea-surface 
temperature linked to outbreaks of harmful algal blooms 
(HABs),43 as happened in 2015 and 2016—are indeed driving 
                                               
values of 𝛺 mean that it is easier for marine species—such as oysters, mussels, corals, 
and many others—to build shells. Id. A value higher than 1 indicates an energetically 
favorable environment to build and maintain shell material, while a value less than 1 
indicates an environment in which species have to expend energy maintaining shell 
material to prevent it from dissolving. Id. The negative effects of OA on shell-forming 
species has been one of the most visible impacts of OA to date, especially insofar as 
industries, including aquaculture (e.g., oysters) and tourism (e.g., coral reefs), face 
increasingly hostile ocean chemistry. 
38. See, e.g., Taro Takahashi et al., Climatological Distributions of pH, pCO2, Total 
CO2, Alkalinity, and CaCO3 Saturation in the Global Surface Ocean, and Temporal 
Changes at Selected Locations, 164 MARINE CHEMISTRY 95 (2014). 
39. Barton et al., supra note 13. 
40. Debby Ianson et al., Vulnerability of a Semienclosed Estuarine Sea to Ocean 
Acidification in Contrast with Hypoxia, 43 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5793, 5793 
(2016). 
41. See Takahashi et al., supra note 38. 
42. See, e.g., Gov. Inslee’s Shellfish Initiative, WASH. GOVERNOR JAY INSLEE, 
http://www.governor.wa.gov/issues/issues/energy-environment/shellfish (last visited 
June 13, 2017) (noting shellfish industry partnership with the state government, and 
noting OA as an issue area of concern). 
43. A Harmful Algal Bloom is a phenomenon in which species of single-celled plant-
like organisms (“algae” is the umbrella term for a large set of unrelated species that 
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economic losses (e.g., in the Dungeness crab fishery).44 It may be 
that OA exacerbates these effects, but again, no smoking gun 
has yet surfaced.45 
In light of these differences, existing political attention to the 
issue of OA in California appears to be largely a testament to 
the initiative of scientists, agency staff, and NGOs who have 
raised the issue and managed to develop and advance 
recommendations for new science and policy surrounding OA 
and hypoxia, some of which were recently incorporated into 
law.46 However, it seems likely that sustained policy attention 
to these ocean issues will require a broader and deeper set of 
constituencies than has yet come to the table in California. 
Unless other and larger industries—such as tourism and 
commercial and recreational fishing—are engaged on the issue, 
it seems likely that the active constituency for action on OA will 
continue to be limited to a small coalition of actors with, in turn, 
limited political influence. 
                                               
meet this description; “alga” is the singular) grow rapidly and produce toxins that can 
harm humans and other animals. For NOAA’s description of the issue and its effects, 
see Harmful Algal Blooms, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/hazards/hab/ (last visited May 9, 2017). 
44. A compendium of regulations relevant to the 2016 Dungeness crab fishery closure 
is available online. See Emergency Regulations to Keep Dungeness Crab Commercial 
Fishery Closed North of Point Reyes and Close Rock Crab Commercial Fishery North of 
Pigeon Point (Section 131, Title 14, CCR), CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, 
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Notices/Regulations/Emergency-Crab-Closure-2016 (last 
visited June 13, 2017). The archive of news bulletins from California Department of Fish 
and Wildlife regarding the 2015 and 2016 closures is available online as well. See 
Invertebrates of Interest: Crabs, CAL. DEP’T FISH & WILDLIFE, 
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/conservation/marine/invertebrates/crabs (last visited June 
13, 2017). 
45. Put more bluntly: no one is yet losing money in California as a result of OA. As in 
Washington, California’s most active industry on OA and related issues has been 
aquaculture. For example, Hog Island Oysters has been politically engaged on OA and 
has acquired two high-precision ocean chemistry sensors (Burkelators) to help adapt to 
changing ocean chemistry, demonstrating the degree to which the aquaculture industry 
is concerned with the issue. See Hog Island’s description of its own work in the field, 
available at: Ocean Acidification Research, HOG ISLAND OYSTER CO., 
https://hogislandoysters.com/science-policy/ocean-acidification-research (last visited 
May 9, 2017). But by comparison, the role of Taylor Shellfish in Washington appears to 
have been much more substantial in terms of driving policy outcomes. For example, Bill 
Dewey, Director of Public Affairs for Taylor Shellfish, was a member of Washington’s 
Blue Ribbon Panel, see 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited May 9, 2017), 
and was directly involved in Washington’s political education surrounding OA as an 
environmental issue. 
46. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630–35632 (West Supp. 2017). 
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III. WASHINGTON AS A BLUEPRINT FOR CALIFORNIA 
Below, I compare Washington and California along three 
axes—legal authority, the political framing of OA as an 
environmental issue and the relevant forums for developing OA 
policy—before analyzing the particular lessons of the 
Washington experience in terms of strategic mistakes to be 
avoided and missing constituencies. I then highlight important 
scientific unknowns, the use of Water Quality Criteria as a 
useful (but politically difficult) policy tool, and finally, the role 
communications and messaging plays for OA and related 
challenges. 
A. Frameworks for Addressing OA in California and 
Washington 
1. Authority 
Legislative (or, by extension, agency) authority is not the 
factor that most immediately limits policy action on OA in either 
Washington or California. As in all states, these jurisdictions 
have broad authority to regulate water quality—including 
authority to do so more stringently than federal law 
demands47—and to fashion other remedies for environmental 
problems largely as they see fit.48 In Washington, the only 
legislation explicitly providing authority for ocean acidification 
policy is that which created the Marine Resources Advisory 
Council (MRAC)—an advisory body with no permanent funding 
and few mandatory duties49—although the state’s baseline 
authority to regulate water quality and air quality is sufficiently 
broad to encompass many of the proposed policy actions dealing 
with OA, hypoxia, and related chemical changes,50 such as 
                                               
47. See, e.g., Ten Ways, supra note 5, for an extended discussion of this authority with 
respect to OA. 
48. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.48.260(a) (2016), (b); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 
13001–13002 (West 2009). 
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016). See infra Part VI for additional information 
on MRAC. 
50. Under the Washington State Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 90.48 (2016), the Department of Ecology has the authority to “prevent and control the 
pollution of the waters of the state.” Id. § 90.48.030. Because “pollution” is broadly 
defined to include both point- and nonpoint-source pollution, id. § 90.48.020, Ecology 
has the authority to prevent and control nonpoint source pollution in the state. This 
authority extends to proactive actions to abate sources with “substantial potential” to 
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minimizing terrestrial nutrient inputs, stormwater, and 
greenhouse gases.51 Despite broad authority to mitigate and 
abate nonpoint sources, Washington currently has no express 
provision for nonpoint source permitting.52 California now has 
two laws expressly directing OPC to work on OA and related 
issues.53 Moreover, California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality 
Control Act54 expressly regulates point and nonpoint source 
pollution via waste discharge requirements, waivers of these 
requirements, and larger-scale basin plans (i.e. regional water 
quality control plan); these may include a variety of standards, 
regulations, and, if needed, prohibitions.55 
Taken together, the existing set of legislative authorities 
mean that Washington and California, like many other 
jurisdictions, have ample authority to carry out point- and 
nonpoint-source water quality improvements to combat OA and 
hypoxia. California, however, unlike Washington, has a 
nonpoint source permitting program in place already,56 which 
would be a valuable tool in any OA policy that aimed, for 
example, to reduce OA-exacerbating local-scale inputs into the 
coastal zone. 
2. Viewing OA as a Political Issue 
Jurisdictions must have political incentives for action on OA, 
or else they will not take such action. Consequently, the way in 
which OA is framed greatly affects how policy suggestions are 
                                               
pollute the state’s waters. Id. A useful 2015 overview of the state’s nonpoint source 
pollution plan (and related authorities) is available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/Wq/nonpoint/index.html. 
51. See Ten Ways, supra note 5. 
52. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUBL’N NO. 15-10-015, WASHINGTON’S 
WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCES OF POLLUTION 
(2015), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1510015.pdf (describing the 
state’s efforts to control nonpoint source pollution, which notably do not include a 
permitting system). 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
54. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., PORTER-COLOGNE WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL ACT WATER CODE DIVISION SEVEN AND RELATED SECTIONS (Apr. 2017). 
55. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., POLICY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM, RESOLUTION 
NO. 2004-0030 (2004). California’s nonpoint source pollution plan, along with 
enforcement and implementation information, is available at 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/nps/plans_policies.shtml. 
56. Id. at 4–5. 
13
Kelly: Ocean Acidification Policy: Applying the Lessons of Washington to
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
14 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y [Vol. 7:1 
 
received and, in turn, whether they are implemented. In 
Washington and California—as elsewhere in the United 
States—state and local jurisdictions have some additional legal 
and policy options to mitigate OA.57 However, it remains 
difficult to assess the benefits of these interventions relative to 
their costs, in part because there are few compelling 
demonstration projects underway.58 Moreover, there has been 
little modeling or other research into the attribution of local 
versus global drivers of OA, or of the relative costs and benefits 
of different local source management measures and objectives, 
leading to an overall lack of specific information that would 
underpin regulatory or legislative action.59 Some policy options, 
such as reducing nutrient inputs, may have benefits (and costs) 
in addition to their effects on OA.60 If such follow-on benefits 
outweigh the costs at the appropriate spatial and jurisdictional 
scales, this kind of action might be a “no regret” solution—that 
is, one that the jurisdiction may find it reasonable to pursue 
even in the absence of OA. Finding actions with such co-benefits 
is a stated goal of SB 1363, newly enacted in California.61 
Jurisdictions have no demonstrated ability to mitigate OA 
yet, and the incentives to undertake significant mitigation vary 
                                               
57. These include water-quality controls, land-use controls, nearshore remediation 
with eelgrass, direct CO2 reduction, and a host of other options. For a full discussion of 
these in a legal context, see, e.g., Ten Ways, supra note 5; R.P. KELLY & M. CALDWELL, 
CTR. FOR OCEAN SOLUTIONS, WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION MATTERS TO CALIFORNIA, AND 
WHAT CALIFORNIA CAN DO ABOUT IT 38 (2012) [hereinafter WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
MATTERS]; and R.P. KELLY & J. GROTE STOUTENBURG, CTR. FOR OCEAN SOLUTIONS, 
WASHINGTON STATE’S LEGAL AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR COMBATING OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION IN STATE WATERS 51 (2012). See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630, 
35631, 35632 (West Supp. 2017).  
58. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630, 35632(a)(1) (West Supp. 2017) requires such 
demonstration projects, but even if these were started immediately, their results would 
not be available for some years. 
59. A notable and recent exception is R.A. Feely et al., Chemical and Biological 
Impacts of Ocean Acidification Along the West Coast of North America, 183 ESTUARINE, 
COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 260 (2016) (apportioning the responsibility for regional chemical 
changes between anthropogenic carbon inputs and respiration by organisms living in 
the water). 
60. See WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION MATTERS, supra note 57 (discussing options and 
co-benefits). 
61. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35632(b) (West Supp. 2017) (“In advancing approaches in 
the program to remove carbon dioxide from seawater, the council shall consider 
approaches that provide multiple cobenefits, including, but not limited to, providing 
essential fish and bird habitat, improving water quality, and mitigating the impacts of 
sea level rise.”). 
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by geography, driver, and the financial and political costs and 
benefits of any proposed action. Both as a strategic and as a 
practical matter, then, a reasonable next step for OA policy 
would be to (1) conceive of OA as part of a larger basket of water-
quality issues that jurisdictions can (and may want to) address, 
together with hypoxia, nutrient pollution, warming, and 
perhaps sea-level rise, and (2) simultaneously work toward 
adoption and implementation of adaptation strategies to reduce 
social/economic impacts of OA and related ocean change. 
California has taken a significant step towards the first of these 
points by linking hypoxia and OA through the OA/H Panel. But 
West Coast-wide policy might benefit from seeing OA as a 
leading indicator of a changing ocean, broadening the tent under 
which diverse constituencies can fit. Put differently, OA might 
be useful to spur action on the suite of other ocean changes 
(warming, deoxygenation, stratification, etc.) that are 
interacting with OA in ways that we do not yet understand.62 
Because each of these changes or issues may have its own 
constituency—stemming from the costs of each to different 
industries, for example—explicitly linking these related 
changes is a way to frame regional/global ocean change as 
relevant to state and local policy.63 
Nevertheless, it is important to be able to single out the 
particular effects of OA—as distinct from other aspects of ocean 
change—for making the case for specific policy and regulatory 
changes, budget appropriations, outreach, and other purposes. 
One needs to point to a specific phenomenon of concern, rather 
than simply “ocean change.” It therefore makes sense to develop 
a decision-making model in which several key elements of ocean 
change—again, each perhaps having its own political 
constituency—are modules that fit together into a larger whole. 
3. Forum 
Washington’s MRAC has reportedly been successful as a low-
                                               
62. For examples and discussion of multistressor impacts to particular organisms, see 
generally Nina Bednaršek et al., Pteropods on the Edge: Cumulative Effects of Ocean 
Acidification, Warming, and Deoxygenation, 145 PROGRESS IN OCEANOGRAPHY 1 (2016); 
Maria Byrne & Rachel Przeslawski, Multistressor Impacts of Warming and Acidification 
of the Ocean on Marine Invertebrates’ Life Histories, 53.4 INTEGRATIVE AND 
COMPARATIVE BIOLOGY 582 (2013). 
63. Perhaps this framing would be a reasonable topic for future communications and 
political science research. 
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pressure environment in which a set of interested parties with 
quite different interests can share views and data.64 Members 
include state elected officials; tribal representatives; shellfish, 
recreational, and commercial fishing industries; other business 
interests, NGOs, government agencies (including state 
departments of Agriculture, Public Lands, Fish & Wildlife, 
Ecology, and others, as well as the U.S. EPA); and others.65 The 
strengths of this body are its multidisciplinary expertise, its 
non-regulatory (and hence, low-stakes) nature, and its official 
status in the Governor’s office, suggesting its importance as an 
advisory body.66 Its weaknesses are a lack of dedicated funding 
and staff, and its non-regulatory role. Essentially, it has neither 
carrot nor stick with which to spur specific on-the-ground 
action, but instead generates value by developing a set of shared 
views across diverse sets of interests. 
By contrast, California’s OPC and State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB)—a state agency with authority over 
both water quality and water quantity67—have greater 
legislative authority and far more permanence than the MRAC. 
Both are state agencies with specific mandates, permanent 
staffs, in-house expertise—and, in the case of SWRCB, 
regulatory authority.68 With respect to the OPC, the non-
regulatory nature of the agency can be helpful because it creates 
a non-threatening forum for hashing out differences among 
stakeholders (similar to the MRAC in Washington).69 This 
function of the OPC will not change under the agency’s new 
legal mandates regarding OA and hypoxia, although the explicit 
mandates the new legislation provides—the Task Force and the 
                                               
64. Interview with Jan Newton, Co-Director, Wash. Ocean Acidification Ctr., in 
Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 21, 2016); Interview with Lisa Graumlich, Dean, College of the 
Environment, Univ. of Wash., in Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 19, 2016). 
65. Information about the Council is available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited June 13, 
2017); meeting documents and products are also available at the same site. See also 
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016) (listing membership of the Council). 
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338(1) (2016). 
67. See generally CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/ (last visited June 13, 2017). 
68. Compare CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, http://www.opc.ca.gov/about/ (last visited 
May 10, 2017), with CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/ (last visited May 6, 2017). 
69. Interview with Cat Kuhlman, former Exec. Dir., Cal. Ocean Prot. Council (Oct. 5, 
2016). 
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Reduction Program70—seem likely to spur the agency to support 
new data-collection and recommendations that could point 
towards greater scrutiny of coastal contributors to OA. 
It may be that a feedback loop between information supply 
and demand will develop among California’s state agencies, 
such that OPC-supported science might suggest answers to key 
questions relevant for coastal mitigation strategies (e.g., 
eelgrass CO2 sequestration, coastal nutrient mitigation), with 
SWRCB then demanding more specific information before 
developing regulations in response to OPC’s findings. This 
interaction—which I emphasize is speculative, at this point—
would not only create an iterative working relationship between 
those agencies, but would also significantly depend upon the 
existence of funding for carrying out the necessary science. If 
OPC’s new legislative mandates come with the expectation of 
further and more permanent funding, it seems likely that 
California’s focus on OA and hypoxia might benefit related 
scientific work on coastal ecosystems and ecosystem services in 
the coastal zone more generally. 
B.  Lessons for California and Other Jurisdictions 
1. Strategic Mistakes in Washington that California Could 
Avoid 
In moving forward on OA, California and other jurisdictions 
have the opportunity to use Washington as an example of how 
to create successful and actionable OA policies. Washington 
made few obvious mistakes during its 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel 
process and in the policy process that followed.71 Apart from 
missing key constituencies—which I treat directly below in a 
separate subsection—the only repeatedly perceived mistakes 
were (1) the failure of the Washington process to tie OA to larger 
trends in a changing ocean, such as HABs, warming and the 
                                               
70. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
71. Here I report a synthesis of perceived mistakes reported by my interviewees, listed 
above in note 1. 
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warm blob,72 and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation73 and El Niño74; 
and (2) the failure to tie OA to human communities and concerns 
surrounding social/ecological resilience. 
In part, the first of these perceived mistakes is only a mistake 
in hindsight: the warm blob did not make its first appearance 
until late 2013, after the bulk of the Washington process had 
concluded.75 The relevant data linking OA to HABs were 
lacking—and to some extent, remain thin76—and it is still not 
obvious how cyclical phenomena such as the Pacific Decadal 
Oscillation77 relate to directional phenomena such as OA. 
California’s process leveraged more recent data and insight 
when it linked OA with hypoxia;78 the result of this more holistic 
framing of OA-plus-hypoxia was a political and scientific 
success, insofar as the outcome included two pieces of legislation 
and increased scientific attention. It seems that agencies, 
                                               
72. The “warm blob” was a large body of anomalously warm water in the Pacific Ocean 
near the West Coast of North America beginning in 2013. The Blob: Warm Water off the 
Coast of the PNW and What it May Mean for Our Summer Weather—A Message From 
the State Climatologist, MAY EVENT SUMMARY (Office of the Wash. State Climatologist), 
June 3, 2014, at 2–4. For a more technical discussion, see Nicholas A. Bond, Causes and 
Impacts of the 2014 Warm Anomaly in the NE Pacific, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 
LETTERS 3414 (2015). 
73. The PDO is a phenomenon by which parts of the Pacific Ocean experience warmer 
or colder phases over periods of decades. See Nathan J. Mantua & Steven R. Hare, The 
Pacific Decadal Oscillation, 58 J. OCEANOGRAPHY 35, 37 (2002). 
74. El Niño is the warm phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a large-
scale weather pattern that affects sea-surface temperatures, winds, and coastal 
upwelling patterns—and hence primary productivity—worldwide. For an explanation of 
the phenomenon, see generally El Niño & La Niña, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., https://www.climate.gov/enso (last visited June 13, 2017). 
75. The Demise of the Warm Blob, EARTH OBSERVATORY (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=87513. 
76. Research on several species indicates that CO2 can play a role in promoting 
toxicity in HABs. See, e.g., J. Sun et al., Effects of Changing pCO2 and Phosphate 
Availability on Domoic Acid Production and Physiology of the Marine Harmful Bloom 
Diatom Pseudo-Nitzschia multiseries, 56 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 829, 830 
(2011); Fei-Xue Fu et al., CO2 and Phosphate Availability Control the Toxicity of the 
Harmful Bloom Dinoflagellate Karlodinium veneficum, 59 AQUATIC MICROBIAL 
ECOLOGY 55, 55–56 (2010); Avery O. Tatters et al., High CO2 Promotes the Production 
of Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning Toxins by Alexandrium catenella from Southern 
California Waters, 30 HARMFUL ALGAE 37, 41 (2013). However, this effect does not occur 
in all species or subspecific strains. See Theresa Hattenrath-Lehmann, et al., The Effects 
of Elevated CO2 on the Growth and Toxicity of Field Populations and Cultures of the 
Saxitoxin-Producing Dinoflagellate, Alexandrium fundyense, 60 LIMNOLOGY & 
OCEANOGRAPHY 198, 208 (2015). 
77. See supra note 73. 
78. See Chan et al., supra note 26 (citing literature from 2012 and later). 
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industry, and others could make a stronger political case for 
action on OA if they discussed OA as part of a broader set of 
changing ocean conditions, to the extent this is feasible from a 
management and scientific perspective. 
As to the second perceived mistake, even now (as of early 
2017), only limited data linking OA effects to resilience and 
well-being in human communities are available.79 The 
Washington process operated at the leading edge of scientific 
information available at the time—and indeed, developed new 
data on the fly in some instances—in an iterative, months-long 
interaction between scientific and policy voices.80 To the extent 
that California and other jurisdictions seek to create effective 
institutions and policy aims, better developing the science to 
understand linkages between OA/hypoxia/ocean change and 
human well-being seems a necessary step. As yet, there is little 
information to act on. But in learning from the Washington 
process, California and other jurisdictions need not simply wait 
for such data to become available; instead, the OA policy process 
can drive the creation of the necessary information through such 
mechanisms as the OPC’s new Task Force and Reduction 
Program. 
2. Missing Constituencies 
A common thread between Washington’s experience with OA 
policy and California’s emerging engagement on the issue is the 
narrow set of constituencies that have so far been involved. In 
both states, it has largely been academic and government 
scientists, together with aquaculture and to some extent 
conservation organizations, that have been responsible for 
raising the public profile of OA.81 The only for-profit-sector 
actors pushing for policy changes have been from the 
                                               
79. See, e.g., J.A. Ekstrom et al., Vulnerability and Adaptation of US Shellfisheries to 
Ocean Acidification, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 207, 207 (2015); Sarah R. Cooley et al., 
Nutrition and Income from Molluscs Today Imply Vulnerability to Ocean Acidification 
Tomorrow, 13 FISH & FISHERIES 182, 185–86 (2012). 
80. 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited June 13, 2017) (listing 
links to panel documents from 2012 meetings). One can track the progress of the Panel’s 
analysis over the summer of 2012 through these documents. 
81. See supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 73–74. Both Panels’ websites list 
the members’ affiliations; this is a good indication of the set of constituencies involved 
to date. 
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commercial aquaculture industry, which has so far played a 
larger role in Washington than in California. It will be necessary 
to engage a much broader and more diverse set of constituencies 
to build and support a durable set of policy efforts surrounding 
the changing coastal ocean. What follows is a selection of 
potential constituencies that respondents named as being 
missing from (or under-represented in) the state-level OA 
conversations so far. 
 
  Commercial and recreational fishing industries. 
Having lost money and jobs in 2015–16 as a result of 
the warm blob and the attendant HABs82—more 
symptoms of a changing ocean—these industries now 
have an appreciation for the scale of the problems 
they are facing, and may be receptive to advocating 
for policy changes to mitigate or adapt to these 
challenges. To the extent that future science ties OA 
more directly to developmental or demographic 
failures in commercially valuable species, one might 
expect these industries to be increasingly interested 
in the issue. 
 
  Native American tribes. Tribes in Washington have 
already been engaged on the issue, from the Blue 
Ribbon Panel to the MRAC and elsewhere.83 This 
engagement will likely increase after the tribes’ 
victory in the Culvert Case.84 In California, engaging 
the tribes in a meaningful way has been particularly 
important with respect to marine protected areas,85 
                                               
82. For a roundup of economic effects of these phenomena, see West Coast Harmful 
Algal Bloom, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/sep15/westcoast-
habs.html (last visited June 13, 2017). 
83. KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION supra note 14 (listing membership); Ocean Acidification 
and Washington State, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited May 6, 2017) 
(listing membership). 
84. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming the role of 
the treaty tribes in a suite of environmental policy decisions in Washington, most 
directly to do with culverts blocking salmon habitat). The Culvert Case has implications 
that go well beyond culverts and salmon; the logic underpinning the decision is that 
upstream state-level decisions that can lead to a decline in salmon runs—and therefore, 
a wide variety of land-use decisions well inland from the ocean—may violate tribes’ 
treaty rights to salmon. Id. at 853. 
85. See, e.g., Dan Bacher, The Tension Between the Yurok Tribe and the State of 
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but in California (and elsewhere), tribes remain 
important potential voices on OA and ocean change 
more generally. 
 
  Commercial agriculture and related industries. 
Agriculture is a huge and indispensable industry, 
and attempting to mitigate nonpoint source pollution 
stemming from agricultural activities has been a 
decades-long, conflict-laden effort with no clear 
endpoint in sight.86 The industry is not likely to be 
receptive to further efforts to minimize runoff and 
nutrient pollution. However, several respondents in 
this project saw OA as a relatively new lens through 
which to talk about the effects of nutrient pollution, 
and perhaps a means of “chipping away at the vitriol” 
between environmental groups and agriculture. 
Agriculture has an economic incentive not to over-use 
fertilizer, the runoff of which is a potential 
contributor to OA.87 Fertilizer costs money, and so 
there is a possibility of a solution benefitting all 
parties, but the economic risk of under-fertilizing 
fields—and hence losing potential crop yields—is 
often greater. OA as an additional potential effect of 
agricultural runoff does not alter this balance of 
incentives, which has remained in place for decades. 
Nevertheless, simply ignoring the agriculture 
industry is not an option for the future of OA policy, 
particularly to the extent that nutrient reductions 
are shown to be an effective tool for mitigating coastal 
OA and hypoxia. In sum, some OA constituents see 
                                               
California in Setting up the North Coast Marine Protected Areas, DAILYKOS (June 9, 
2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/6/9/1098820/-Yurok-Tribe-challenges-
MLPA-Initiative-s-terminally-flawed-science. 
86. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 120 
(2d Cir. 1994) (finding that manure from a confined animal feeding operation is a point 
source discharge for purposes of the Clean Water Act, and thus not subject to the Act’s 
agricultural exemption, under which agricultural stormwater is a nonpoint source and 
therefore exempt from permitting requirements); League of Wilderness Defs. Blue 
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing the difference between a statutory Clean Water Act exemption for 
agricultural nonpoint source discharges and silvicultural pest control); Waterkeeper 
All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing “various challenges to [an 
EPA regulation] under the Clean Water Act in order to abate and control the emission 
of water pollutants from concentrated animal feeding operations.”). 
87. See, e.g., KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION, supra note 14. 
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OA as a new lens through which to view the politics 
of agricultural runoff mitigation, but given the 
economic incentives at play, no clear framing or 
policy option currently exists for doing so. 
 
  Cities. In the view of at least one high-level 
respondent, reducing nutrient loads from stormwater 
is an easier target than nutrient loads from 
agriculture, despite the high cost of the 
infrastructure required for this kind of city-scale 
mitigation. Existing federal programs under the 
Clean Water Act, and other major infrastructure 
financing, are likely to be useful in reducing runoff 
from urban areas (e.g., via combined sewer 
overflows), another no-regrets solution. A similar 
logic applies to publicly-owned treatment works 
(POTWs), which are point sources under the Clean 
Water Act.88 
 
  Larger environmental NGO communities. 
Engagement from these groups to help develop 
specific, actionable policy on OA—and for broader 
policy response to a changing ocean—is important 
and likely achievable by linking issue areas and 
broadening the base of groups interested in ocean 
change. Joining such groups in a longer-term 
coalition would also be useful for improving the 
outreach and communications capacity of the OA 
constituency. 
 
  Federal agencies. Although NOAA is involved in OA 
science (and to some extent, policy) via its OA 
program,89 other federal agencies such as the Army 
Corps and the EPA have been less engaged. Reaching 
out to these agencies by speaking to their existing 
nondiscretionary duties may create greater 
cooperation and leverage existing resources. 
Moreover, the EPA is responsible for implementing 
                                               
88. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2016). 
89. NOAA OCEAN ACIDIFICATION PROGRAM, http://oceanacidification.noaa.gov/ (last 
visited June 13, 2017). 
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the Clean Water Act90, and may play a potentially 
important role in developing water-quality science, 
criteria, and standards. With the change of 
presidential administrations beginning in January 
2017, it seems less likely that federal agencies will be 
willing to undertake discretionary duties toward 
these same ends. 
 
  Foundations. One high-level respondent suggested 
that private foundations should be more involved 
with developing options to mitigate and adapt to 
coastal ocean change. The political and financial 
capital these groups bring could help build a more 
sustainable political coalition and policy 
infrastructure, particularly given the uncertainty of 
federal money in a new administration. 
3. Important Scientific Unknowns 
In California, as in Washington, state agencies are cautiously 
awaiting more concrete information about a few critical 
unknowns surrounding OA and related policy.91 Of primary 
importance is the effect of local contributions to OA in coastal 
water bodies. Although a few scientific papers have addressed 
this topic preliminarily,92 ongoing modeling efforts in California 
will help reduce the uncertainty about how much difference 
local contributions make to the overall OA picture. Similarly, 
demonstration projects and other emerging science will help 
specify how effective seagrass restoration/expansion and other 
                                               
90. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
91. OPC staff participated in a recent forum at Stanford University focused on water 
quality criteria. CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, MEETING SUMMARY, OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION: SETTING WATER QUALITY GOALS 2016, 
http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/_media_library/2017/01/OA_Uncommon_Dialogue.pd
f. Also, OPC is funding six demonstration projects to fill these scientific gaps. Ocean 
Protection Council Meeting of October 17, 2016—Item 4: Consideration of Authorization 
to Disburse Proposition 84 Funds, CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://www.opc.ca.gov/item-4-consideration-of-authorization-to-disburse-proposition-
84-funds/ [hereinafter OPC Meeting Notes]. 
92. See Richard A. Feely et al., The Combined Effects of Ocean Acidification, Mixing, 
and Respiration on pH and Carbonate Saturation in an Urbanized Estuary, 88 
ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 442, 443 (2010); Richard A. Feely et al., Chemical 
and Biological Impacts of Ocean Acidification Along the West Coast of North America, 
183 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 260 (2016). 
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mitigating techniques might be.93 As soon as these scientific 
data are available, discussions around mitigation and 
adaptation can become more specific and targeted. In particular, 
the SWRCB will very likely wait until hard data are available 
before considering revising pH or nutrient Water Quality 
Criteria, although OPC’s Task Force and Reduction Plan may 
be able to drive the development of these kinds of data more 
quickly than would have otherwise happened. 
4. Water Quality Criteria 
Adopting new or revised Water Quality Criteria under the 
Clean Water Act is perhaps the most concrete way in which 
states could move to quickly mitigate the effects of OA, hypoxia, 
and related issues. However, water quality has been a policy 
battleground for decades, and OA is not likely to be the issue 
that tips the scales in favor of more comprehensively regulating 
water pollution from either point or nonpoint sources.94 A key 
strategy question is whether there is sufficient political appetite 
in California (or elsewhere) to take on a revision of Water 
Quality Criteria, which Washington has so far declined to do. 
Some evidence points to the existence of such an appetite in 
California: its mention in the new OA legislation, discussion at 
high levels (OPC, SWRCB, SCCWRP), and conversation at the 
recent Stanford-sponsored Uncommon Dialogue, which focused 
on the water quality question.95 Nevertheless, nonpoint source 
pollution is a political third rail in California and any other state 
in which agriculture (with which nonpoint source pollution is 
associated) is a major industry.96 This seems unlikely to change, 
although as noted above in the discussion of missing 
constituencies, OA does provide a new lens through which to 
                                               
93. For example, consider the six projects funded by OPC that are ongoing. See OPC 
Meeting Notes, supra note 91. 
94. Several years ago, one source expressed this sentiment to me as (to paraphrase): 
“[K]ids are dying of selenium poisoning in their drinking water in the Salinas Valley, 
and you want to change Water Quality Criteria because oysters are somewhat unhappy 
in current ocean conditions?” This is an excellent moral, practical, and political question 
to keep in mind in any conversation surrounding water quality. 
95. See discussion of this meeting, supra note 91. 
96. For one of many discussions of the challenges of nonpoint-source pollution 
regulation in agricultural areas, see Mark Lubell, Policy Perspective: Is Non-Point 
Source Pollution a Myth?, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y & BEHAVIOR (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://environmentalpolicy.ucdavis.edu/node/158. 
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understand the impacts of nutrient pollution on the coastal 
ocean and the human communities that depend upon it. 
5. Communications and Messaging 
A minority of Americans has even heard of OA,97 let alone 
engaged on the issue. Consequently, a central challenge in 
building a political constituency for OA is adequately 
communicating the challenge to new and more diverse groups 
who are likely to have concrete interests in OA and in the ways 
it might be addressed. I suggest that “water pollution” is likely 
to be a successful framing for OA as an issue. “Air pollution” (as 
a frame) engenders far more policy support for greenhouse gas 
reductions than does “climate change” or related frames,98 
perhaps in part because of co-benefits of air-pollution reduction 
such as declines in asthma.99 By analogy, “water pollution” may 
be an effective and accurate way of linking OA to larger water-
quality issues, entraining a more varied suite of constituents, 
and building popular support for mitigation and adaptation. 
Such a framing perhaps rightly situates OA as an issue squarely 
within the purview of OPC, the Water Boards, and other 
agencies concerned with surface water quality in California, and 
can provide important links to co-benefits of OA reduction, such 
as mitigating eutrophication, hypoxia, and HABs. A concern 
with framing OA squarely as a water pollution issue is that 
doing so may make it more difficult to build support among 
those who are passionate about climate change (and therefore, 
perhaps OA) but have been less engaged on water-quality 
issues. Alternatively, “water quality” may be a useful frame for 
developing actionable policy elements that overlap with existing 
water-quality constituencies, while a broader “global change” 
frame is useful for connecting with climate-change and allied 
                                               
97. Summer 2012 Special Report: Public Awareness of Ocean Acidification, THE 
OCEAN PROJECT, http://theoceanproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Special_Report_Summer_2012_Public_Awareness_of_Ocean_
Acidification.pdf. But see L.C. Frisch et al., Gauging Perceptions of Ocean Acidification 
in Alaska, 53 MARINE POL’Y 101, 105 (2015) (suggesting a majority of Alaskans had 
heard of OA). 
98. M. Mossler et al., How Does Framing Affect Policy Support for Emissions 
Mitigation? Testing the Effect of Ocean Acidification and Other Carbon Emissions 
Frames, 45 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE  63, 63 (2017). 
99. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 ES-4 (1997), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/contsetc.pdf.  
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constituencies.100 
HABs, too, are a crucial link to human well-being and to the 
fishing community specifically.101 Talking about OA as a 
phenomenon of global ocean change related to HABs may bring 
agencies, industry, and others into the OA conversation to a 
greater degree. However, stronger science describing the 
interactions between OA and HABs is needed to effectively 
facilitate these communications. 
IV. EMERGING ISSUES 
Many open questions persist at the boundary of emerging OA 
science and policy. What follows is a summary of questions and 
ideas that respondents102 suggested, which I include here to 
illustrate the frontiers along which policy actors are thinking. 
 
1. In what ways can OA policy better link to existing 
agency mandates and programs leverages 
government investment in science and 
infrastructure, and therefore build a broader OA 
constituency? These mandates and programs 
include marine protected areas, National Estuarine 
Research Reserves, artificial reefs, oyster reefs 
(particularly with reference to flood control), 
aquaculture health and safety, and others. 
2. What does social adaptation to OA look like? Can 
we define what it means to be prepared for change 
we can’t prevent? 
3. How can OA policy actions best dovetail with 
existing social priorities—for example by helping 
vulnerable human communities—to create no-
regrets social/ecological policies? 
4. What are the costs and benefits of legislative versus 
administrative action on OA, and how should we 
start thinking about information needs and 
constituency development for each? This seems an 
especially relevant question in the context of 
                                               
100. An important note here: “climate change” (as a frame) can alienate 
constituencies. Alaska declined to participate in the West Coast OA/H Panel because of 
its explicit link to anthropogenic climate change. 
101. As illustrated by the economic and social effects of the emergency crab fishery 
closure in 2016, supra note 40. 
102. Respondents were the interviewees listed in supra note 1. 
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California’s recent state legislation on OA, and the 
political changes at the federal level that will 
continue to emerge with the change of presidential 
administration in 2017, such that the choice of 
legislative versus administrative forum might 
differ depending on the jurisdiction in question. 
5. With respect to administrative action and to water 
quality criteria in particular, what is the return-on-
investment (in terms of OA harm reduction) we 
might expect, given the timelines, capital cost, and 
political cost of action? 
6. What is the overall vision guiding the set of coastal 
environmental policies at issue here? What are the 
relevant targets at which OA/hypoxia actions 
should ultimately aim? We live in a changing world, 
and the management question is not how to 
maintain status quo, but instead, what we want our 
world to look like and how to get there. 
7. What is the minimum set of information California 
needs to arrive at a decision on each of its likely OA 
policy decision points, and how can California 
realistically secure funding to develop the needed 
information? 
8. Given the recent OPC-funded efforts in 
biogeochemical modeling to inform California 
policy questions,103 developing social-science 
modeling or experimentation to integrate with 
those data would help determine least-cost ways of 
meeting ocean chemistry goals. For example, 
voluntary and incentive-based programs might 
achieve greater gains at a lower cost than 
regulatory approaches to OA, but finding out would 
require dedicated research on the matter. 
9. How dependent are California and its science 
community on federal support—either political or 
financial—in moving OA science forward? Given 
the change of presidential administration in early 
2017, are adjustments necessary? If so, what are 
likely sources of support for the necessary science? 
10. How would California likely respond to a lawsuit 
from conservation organizations, similar to 
                                               
103. E.g., the six projects funded by OPC in October 2016, supra note 93. 
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previous suits against Washington State? 
11. With respect to regional and international 
coordination, what effect will the Pacific Coast 
Collaborative have in the U.S. and Canada, and 
elsewhere? One attractive element of a larger, 
region-wide collaborative policy effort is the option 
of developing regional pollutant limits, as states in 
the Northeast have done with mercury emissions 
and other air pollutants.104 Could this be a model 
for concerted West Coast CO2 action? What will 
come of the International Alliance to Combat Ocean 
Acidification? 
12. Relevant to the discussion surrounding networked 
resources and interactions among jurisdictions, it is 
worth noting that regional monitoring and 
science—standing alone—does not mitigate 
anything. 
13. The costs of routine ocean chemistry monitoring 
continue to be high, and only specialized and 
reasonably well-funded entities such as wastewater 
dischargers or aquaculture firms (e.g., Taylor 
Shellfish and Hog Island Oyster Company) are 
likely to acquire high-precision monitoring tools.105 
Will the costs of routine monitoring drop with the 
development of tools such as the SeaFET and SAMI 
sensors, enabling citizen-science groups and other 
non-specialist users? 
14. Relatedly, if the costs of monitoring come down and 
reliability increases, what ways might state water 
quality regulators start building monitoring 
                                               
104. See NESCAUM: NORTHEAST STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.nescaum.org/ (last visited June 13, 2017). Interestingly, airborne pollutants 
such as mercury—and CO2—can be eligible for Clean Water Act funding under § 319 
because they become nonpoint source water pollutants. For example, the state of 
Michigan has a statewide Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for nonpoint-source 
mercury, most of which comes from atmospheric deposition. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
QUALITY, STATEWIDE MICHIGAN MERCURY TMDL PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT ES-2 (2013), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/wrd-swas-hgtmdl-draft_415360_7.pdf (“In 
Michigan, the majority of mercury pollution is a result of atmospheric deposition.”). 
105. For example, Sunburst Sensors LLC won an international competition—the $2 
million Wendy Schmidt Ocean Health X-Prize—in 2015 for creating high-precision pH 
sensors that were also affordable. These units remain in prototype, but the company 
anticipates them being available commercially in 2017. When available, they will cost 
thousands of dollars. Telephone Interview with James Beck, Co-Owner, Sunburst 
Sensors LLC (May 10, 2017). 
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requirements into new NPDES permits/waste 
discharge requirements? Would these data be 
useful for biogeochemical monitoring of the kind 
envisioned for OA, hypoxia, and related issues? 
15. A longer-term question is whether, and how, OA 
efforts might link to California’s cap-and-trade 
greenhouse gas system for reducing CO2. For 
example, it might be reasonable to create carbon 
credits for storage through eelgrass/seagrass 
restoration if the science were there to support it 
and the policy tools were in place to properly 
account for the additionality (or lack thereof) 
associated with such restoration efforts. Another 
high-level respondent referred to this linkage as a 
“secret hope,” as it would legitimize OA mitigation 
while creating incentives (i.e., value) for action. 
Note that this policy path would bridge social 
adaptation and mitigation, while providing the co-
benefits associated with seagrasses and wetlands. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, two identifiable waves of OA work have 
focused on (1) the existence of OA as a phenomenon,106 and (2) 
drivers and consequences of that phenomenon.107 The third 
wave of work—what to do about it—has built more slowly, but 
has a clear trajectory, with NOAA showing early interest, and 
then Washington, Oregon, California, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, and New York taking some amount of state-level 
action on OA in the past three years.108 California, in particular, 
has both the scientific and the policy infrastructure in place to 
develop a sustained program on OA and related issues. 
Maintaining this focus will require new science to answer the 
key policy question quite reasonably posed by California 
                                               
106. E.g., Joan A. Kleypas et al., Geochemical Consequences of Increased Atmospheric 
Carbon Dioxide on Coral Reefs, 284 SCI. 118 (1999); THE ROYAL SOC’Y, OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE (2005), 
www.royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/ 
2005/9634.pdf. 
107. E.g., Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. 
REV. OF MARINE SCI. 169 (2009); Wei-Jun Cai et al., Acidification of Subsurface Coastal 
Waters Enhanced by Eutrophication, 4 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 766, 766 (2011). 
108. Sarah R. Cooley, et al., Community-Level Actions that Can Address Ocean 
Acidification, 2 FRONTIERS MARINE SCI. 1, 7 (2016); Assemb. B. 10264, 2016 Leg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2016) (enacted) (establishing the New York State ocean acidification task force). 
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agencies: can we really make a difference, and if so, how much? 
Long-term success will require a broader and more diverse 
political constituency than OA currently enjoys. Developing this 
constituency requires directly linking OA to human well-being, 
and in turn, conceiving of OA in the broader context of a 
changing ocean in which warming, hypoxia, HABs, and other 
related challenges simultaneously shift ecosystems and the 
services from which societies benefit. 
VI. APPENDIX: KEY INSTITUTIONS 
Among the institutions likely to be centers of gravity for 
future OA and related policy work along the West Coast are 
Washington’s Marine Resources Advisory Council and 
Departments of Ecology and Natural Resources, and 
California’s Ocean Protection Council and State Water 
Resources Control Board. These institutions are state 
governmental bodies with significant connections to academia, 
industry, NGOs, and federal agencies. As such, they may be able 
to overcome the chicken-or-egg problems that underlie many of 
the potential OA policy actions by setting up clear science-policy 
questions, generating relevant data, and then acting on those 
data in relatively short order. 
A. Washington 
The Marine Resources Advisory Council (MRAC)109 is a non-
regulatory (i.e., advisory) panel in the Washington Governor’s 
office, created by statute110 as a result of the Blue Ribbon Panel’s 
recommendations. The purpose of the Council is to function as 
a forum for the exchange of views and information, without the 
immediate possibility of regulation.111 Its role is to coordinate 
among stakeholders, advise the Governor and scientists at the 
University of Washington, seek funding to advance its own 
recommendations, and do public outreach and education.112 
The Washington OA Center is a research entity at the 
University of Washington, created by statute following the Blue 
                                               
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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Ribbon Panel’s recommendations to serve the state.113 It 
coordinates research among University and allied scientists 
(e.g., NOAA, Department of Ecology) on OA and provides 
scientific input to the Marine Resources Advisory Council and 
the Governor’s office.114 
The Washington State Department of Ecology is the main 
state regulatory agency for environmental affairs.115 The 
Department of Ecology facilitates work on OA in Washington 
through collaborations with NOAA, UW, and others.116 The 
Department of Ecology also has regulatory authority over water 
and air quality in the State, and as such it combines functions 
that some other States have separated into different 
administrative agencies (e.g., California has separate air- and 
water-quality control agencies).117 The Department of Ecology is 
therefore both a producer of OA information and a target 
audience for that same information. 
The Washington State Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) is the state agency that manages state trust lands to 
generate revenue and to preserve public natural resources 
including forests, water, and aquatic lands.118 DNR’s current 
strategic plan calls for developing OA mitigation and adaptation 
strategies, and its role as steward of aquatic lands could put the 
agency in an important position for testing—and developing 
incentives for—policy actions in nearshore habitat.119 
                                               
113.  WASH. REV. CODE § 79.105.150 (2016) (establishing funding for the OA Center); 
see also Amanda Carr, We Can Lead: Washington State’s Efforts to Address Ocean 
Acidification, 3 WASH. J.  ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 188 (2013) (describing Washington’s 
experience with OA policy); Amanda Carr, Continuing to Lead: Washington State’s 
Efforts to Address Ocean Acidification, 6 WASH. J.  ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 543 (2016) 
(describing Washington’s progress in addressing OA and its influence on other States). 
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.105.150 (2016). 
115. Id. § 43.21A.020 (2016). 
116. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-98-010 (2013); Water Quality Program, WASH. STATE 
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY (2016), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/wqhome.html. For an 
example of such collaboration and facilitation, see the Department of Ecology’s hosting 
of the Marine Resources Advisory Council’s website and meetings, which feature content 
from NOAA, University of Washington, and many others. Ocean Acidification and 
Washington State, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited June 13, 
2017). 
117. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm (last visited June 
13, 2017); CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov (last 
visited June 13, 2017). 
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.30 (2016). 
119. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 2014–2017 STRATEGIC PLAN 11, 35 (June 2014), 
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The NOAA Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory is a 
federal laboratory, located in Seattle and focused on 
atmospheric and oceanographic research.120 The lab has close 
ties to the University of Washington, the Department of 
Ecology, and related researchers, and its work has underpinned 
much of the scientific consensus surrounding OA in 
Washington.121 
B. California 
The California Ocean Protection Council (OPC) is a non-
regulatory, cabinet-level body that coordinates administrative 
agencies and suggests legislative and policy actions on ocean 
issues in California. OPC is the entity through which the state’s 
new OA legislation—AB 2139 (Williams, Ocean Acidification 
and Hypoxia Task Force) and SB 1363 (Monning, Ocean 
Acidification and Hypoxia Reduction Program)122—will work. 
Given the express role of the OPC in California’s environmental 
apparatus, and especially given OPC’s role in helping to convene 
the OA/H panel and as the locus of new statutory cover for OA 
work, it seems likely that OPC will be a center of gravity for OA-
related work in California for the foreseeable future. In 
particular, OPC has recently funded six projects to follow up on 
the Panel’s recommendations,123 and will be using the new 
legislation to guide the implementation of the state’s OA 
program over the coming years. Historically, OPC has had 
significant bond funding to invest in strategic research, on-the-
ground restoration and environmental protection projects, and 
policy development (for example, Proposition 84124 provided 
funding, supporting the first round of work under the new 
legislation). Future legislation will need to fund research and 
other OA-related activities if those activities—and OPC’s role in 
                                               
http://file.dnr.wa.gov/publications/em_strategic_plan_2014_2017.pdf. 
120. About PMEL, NOAA PACIFIC MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY, 
https://pmel.noaa.gov/about-pmel (last visited June 13, 2017). 
121. E.g., Richard A. Feely et al., Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive “Acidified” 
Water onto the Continental Shelf, 320 SCI. 1490, 1490 (2008). 
122. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630–35632 (West Supp. 2017). 
123. OPC Meeting Notes, supra note 91. 
124. The Safe Drinking Water, Water Quality and Supply, Flood Control, River and 
Coastal Protection Bond Act of 2006 (Proposition 84) passed in 2006, authorizing $5.388 
billion. Proposition 84 Overview, CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, 
http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/p84.aspx (last visited June 13, 2017). 
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the field—are to remain stable in the long run. OPC’s partners 
include scientists in the field, the NOAA OA program, and the 
Pacific Coast Collaborative partners in other jurisdictions. 
California Ocean Science Trust (OST) is a non-profit entity 
created by state statute, and guided by a Board of Trustees 
appointed by the Secretary for Natural Resources.125 OST works 
to integrate science and decision-making across state agencies, 
and convenes the OPC’s Science Advisory Team.126 OST plans 
to continue working with the OPC and its Science Advisory 
Team to address some of the critical science needs raised by the 
OA/H Panel’s recommendations. In light of its mission and past 
activities, OST could also potentially take on roles supporting 
the science task force required by the Williams bill.127 
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) is a state 
agency—under the larger umbrella of the California 
Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA)—with authority 
over both water quality and water quantity (allocation),128 the 
former of which is particularly relevant for OA policy in 
California. Although authority for developing most terrestrial 
water quality objectives and plans falls to nine Regional Water 
Quality Control Boards, the state-level Board remains the 
primary responsible agency for the California Ocean Plan and 
the Enclosed Bays & Estuaries Plan, the two sets of standards, 
criteria, and implementation measures that are most relevant 
for OA, hypoxia, and related issues.129 Consequently, to the 
extent there is a political appetite to develop or revise relevant 
Water Quality Criteria—and to the extent that compelling data 
exist on which to base such criteria—the SWRCB would lead 
that effort. Presumably, the SWRCB and the OPC would work 
together should new Criteria become necessary, although there 
is not currently a dedicated mechanism for such cooperation. 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is a State 
                                               
125. About Us, CAL. OCEAN SCI. TR. http://www.oceansciencetrust.org/about-us/ (last 
visited June 13, 2017). 
126. Id. 
127. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35631 (West Supp. 2017). 
128. CAL. WATER CODE § 174(b) (West Supp. 2017). 
129. In addition to the Plans stated, several amendments to other Plans were recently 
adopted or are under development. See Ocean Standards, CAL. STATE WATER RES. 
CONTROL BD., 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/ocean/index.shtml (last visited 
June 13, 2017). 
33
Kelly: Ocean Acidification Policy: Applying the Lessons of Washington to
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2019
34 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y [Vol. 7:1 
 
agency—also under the umbrella of CalEPA—with authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases and other air pollutants.130 It 
remains unclear how to link policy mechanisms for mitigating 
OA with California’s larger efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions such as the current CO2 cap and trade system.131 To 
date, CARB has not been a major contributor to the OA/H policy 
process in California, but it remains conceptually important as 
a possible link to the state’s mechanism for reducing the 
ultimate causes of OA.132 
The Pacific Coast Collaborative is an association among 
California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (with 
Alaska observing) formed in 2008133 to better coordinate actions 
to address climate change and related effects, of which OA is 
one. This body is important for regional-scale coordination and 
for outreach to the wider international community.134 
 
                                               
130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39003 (West 2009). 
131. Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited May 7, 2017). 
132. The current discussion draft of the 2030 cap & trade scoping plan highlights some 
potential work on eelgrass with respect to OA. CAL. AIR RES. BD., 2030 TARGET SCOPING 
PLAN UPDATE, DISCUSSION DRAFT 64, 67 (2016),  
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2030target_sp_dd120216.pdf. 
133. MEMORANDUM TO ESTABLISH THE PACIFIC COAST COLLABORATIVE (June 30, 
2008), http://pacificcoastcollaborative.org/agreements/. 
134. This outreach may take place through the recently announced International 
Alliance on OA. See INT’L ALL. TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, http://oaalliance.org 
(last visited May 7, 2017). 
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